I show that persistent underconfidence and overconfidence each arise from the combination of Bayesian learning about one's own abilities and rationally choosing to exert more effort when more confident. If an agent believes that greater effort reliably improves outcomes, then the agent learns away overconfidence faster than he learns away underconfidence. The agent becomes underconfident on average. In contrast, the agent becomes overconfident on average if he believes that greater effort increases his exposure to chance. The results imply that a principal can extract more effort from an agent by conditioning the precision of feedback on performance, and the mechanism is consistent with modern understanding of depression.
Introduction
How much should we read into our successes and failures? Can we reduce our exposure to luck by trying harder? Many people, like Emerson's "strong men", believe that their efforts will have predictable consequences, but many others, like Emerson's "shallow men", are quick to attribute the outcomes of their efforts to chance. People in the first group learn a lot about themselves by observing the fruits of their efforts, whereas people in the second group do not infer as much from these outcomes. We will here see a surprising result: rational Bayesian agents systematically misjudge their own ability, and whether they become overconfident or underconfident depends on the predictability of their efforts' consequences.
Overconfidence is now generally recognized as an important factor in many markets. For instance, overconfidence among traders can explain financial market anomalies (Daniel and Hirshleifer, 2015) , overconfidence can explain why some people persist as entrepreneurs (Astebro et al., 2014) , and overconfidence among business executives can affect corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Taylor, 2015) . Economists have therefore sought to model the psychological biases and motivations that can enable overconfidence to persist in the face of contrary data. However, some experimental evidence suggests that underconfidence is also prevalent (e.g., Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2002; Blavatskyy, 2009; Clark and Friesen, 2009; Urbig et al., 2009; Murad et al., 2016) . And underconfidence may be more important for wellbeing: the welfare cost of depression, often considered a product or symptom of underconfidence, is enormous. Depression afflicts around one in six adults in developed countries and contributes more to developed countries' disease burden than does any single class of physical illness (Layard and Clark, 2015) . In the U.S. alone, major depressive disorders affect 15.4 million adults and cost $210 billion per year (Greenberg et al., 2015) . Given the potential pervasiveness and costs of underconfidence, it is important that we also understand its origins and the prospects for treatment.
I here propose a unified model in which persistent overconfidence and persistent underconfidence both emerge from Bayesian updating by rational agents who have neoclassical utility functions, do not exhibit behavioral biases, and initially hold well-calibrated beliefs about their own ability.
1 An agent chooses his effort level in each period to maximize his expected reward. The reward depends on his effort level, his unknown ability, and unobserved shocks. Because ability and effort are complementary, the agent applies more effort 1 As we will see, previous literature deviates in one or more of these three dimensions.
when he thinks he is of high ability. Upon observing the reward, the agent updates his beliefs about his ability. The agent's effort choices affect the strength of the signal provided by the observed reward. I show that whether the agent becomes overconfident or underconfident on average depends on his understanding about how his effort level affects the variance of his reward. He becomes overconfident on average if he thinks that the variance increases sufficiently strongly in his effort, and he becomes underconfident on average otherwise. Only in a knife-edge case will we expect an agent to display neither overconfidence nor underconfidence.
Begin by considering an agent who believes that the variance of his rewards is due to transient shocks to his ability. Greater effort amplifies the marginal effect of his durable ability but also amplifies the marginal effect of transient shocks to his ability. Greater effort therefore does not affect the signal of his true ability provided by the observed reward. I study the distribution of the agent's posterior beliefs at some future time t. I show that if the agent initially estimates his own ability correctly (i.e., if his prior is centered around the true value), then he will, on average, estimate his ability correctly at any future time t as well (i.e., his posterior at any future time t is, on average, centered around his true ability). For the agent to be underconfident or overconfident on average, he would have to start with an incorrect estimate of his own ability. This special case is consistent with standard intuition. Now consider an agent who believes that the variance of his rewards is due to external shocks that are independent of his effort choices. Like Emerson's "strong man", he believes that his efforts have a consistent effect on outcomes. For instance, he believes that running harder should improve his time by a consistent amount that depends on his ability. The signal contained in his observed reward now depends on his chosen effort level. When he chooses high effort, he believes that he increases the marginal effect of his true ability on the observed reward without changing the variance of the reward. As a result, the observed reward contains a stronger signal of his true ability and he substantially adjusts his posterior beliefs upon observing the reward.
Imagine that the agent has a prior centered around his true ability at time 0. Also imagine that the unobserved shock happens to take on a high value at time 0, so that the agent perceives a surprisingly high reward at time 0. As a result, he raises his central estimate of his ability and chooses greater effort at time 1. Because he is now overconfident, his time 1 reward will, on average, be surprisingly small and will lead him to reduce his time 2 ability estimate towards the true value. Following the average time 1 reward, the agent will still be overconfident at time 2 but less so than at time 1. Indeed, because his high time 1 effort made his beliefs especially sensitive to the observed time 1 reward, he will tend to be only slightly overconfident by time 2. Now imagine that the unobserved shock happens to take on a low value at time 0. In this case, the agent reduces his central estimate of his ability and chooses lower effort at time 1. Because he is now underconfident, his time 1 reward will, on average, be surprisingly large and will lead him to raise his time 2 ability estimate towards the true value. Following the average time 1 reward, the agent will still be underconfident at time 2 but less so than at time 1. But because his low time 1 effort made his beliefs especially insensitive to the observed time 1 reward, his underconfidence may still be nearly as severe at time 2 as it was at time 1.
If we average across these two possibilities, the agent does not display any bias at time 1 because he adjusts his beliefs symmetrically in response to high or low time 0 shocks. However, the agent is underconfident on average at time 2: his average central estimate is below his true ability. The critical mechanism is that the agent's posterior beliefs are more sensitive to the observed reward when his effort is high. The agent learns away time 0 shocks especially quickly when they lead him to raise his central estimate of his own ability, and he learns away time 0 shocks especially slowly when they lead him to lower his central estimate of his own ability. The Bayesian agent becomes underconfident on average despite his initially correct beliefs about his own ability. In fact, I show that he will remain underconfident on average in any future period, approaching correct beliefs only asymptotically as he accumulates infinite data.
2 Further, I show that the agent eventually becomes underconfident on average even if he is initially overconfident, and I show that a population of agents with heterogeneous initial confidence levels will eventually display underconfidence on average.
Rational updating can also endogenously generate overconfidence. Now let the agent believe that greater effort reduces the signal contained in his reward. Like Emerson's "shallow man", he believes that his efforts are largely modulated by circumstance. For example, he believes that running harder reduces the consistency of his time by increasing the consequences of each day's minor variations in weather, fitness, or diet.
3 This agent's beliefs will be especially sensitive to news following low effort choices. Because he chooses low effort when he lacks confidence in his own ability, he learns away overly low ability estimates especially rapidly. And he learns away overly high ability estimates only slowly because he believes that his high efforts lead to especially noisy outcomes. When this agent has an overly high ability estimate, he will tend to receive bad news, but he attributes his failures more to chance than to his own ability. This agent becomes overconfident on average, an effect that persists into future periods, and any heterogeneous population of such "shallow men" eventually displays overconfidence on average.
The present model is consistent with recent field research into overconfidence. Hoffman and Burks (2019) document that long-haul truckers fluctuate between overconfidence and underconfidence when predicting the miles they will drive in the coming week. Nonetheless, truckers are overconfident on average, and that average overconfidence declines only slowly as truckers gain more experience on the job. Rationalizing their data in a structural model, Hoffman and Burks (2019) estimate that truckers perceive the variance of their productivity shocks to be greater than the true variance, leading them to update beliefs about their own productivity only slowly. The present analysis is consistent with this result: given that truckers are overconfident on average, the present analysis implies that they must believe that the variance of their productivity shocks is high when their effort and confidence are high, and because they learn away overconfidence only slowly, they perceive that variance to be high more often than not. It is therefore unsurprising that Hoffman and Burks (2019) find a high perception of variance. Instead of estimating only a single variance parameter, the present analysis suggests allowing perceived variance to vary with over-and underconfidence.
I next describe an application of these results to the design of feedback from a principal to an agent before surveying previous literature. I describe a second application in Section 6, to cognitive behavioral therapy.
Application 1: Feedback from Management
Feedback about job performance is a pervasive feature of employer-employee relationships. Gibbs (1991) observes that the existence of this feedback suggests that employers have more information about employees' performance than do the employees themselves. He also observes that maintaining employees' self-confidence is a priority for employers. Putting these pieces together, employers may be able to extract additional effort from employees by managing their beliefs about their own ability. The present analysis suggests a novel way that a principal can manage beliefs to extract effort-one that does not require any type of deceit. The principal need only commit to giving the agent more information after bad performances than after good performances. This feedback rule may seem counterintuitive, but it helps the agent to learn away mistakenly low beliefs about her own ability faster than she learns away mistakenly high beliefs.
4
For example, an employer could require one-on-one performance reviews with underperforming employees but not with overperforming employees. In these reviews, the agent would gain insight into other factors that could have affected performance, such as broader market conditions. Underperforming agents would then quickly learn away shocks due to bad luck, but overperforming agents would not rapidly learn away shocks due to good luck.
As a second example, managers who rate their employees' performance could finely divide ratings among underperforming employees-highlighting the degree to which their performance was merely bad luck-while compressing ratings for highly performing employees. Indeed, Cappelli and Conyon (2018) , among others, find evidence of just such a skew in the distribution of employee ratings.
5
As a final example, consider the setting of Hoffman and Burks (2019) . The trucking firm could provide detailed feedback about realized traffic conditions on possible routes when a trucker manages only a low mileage week but could withhold such information when a trucker achieves a high mileage week.
These types of interventions require the employer to abide only by simple rules governing the detail of feedback given. Because that feedback is honest, employees have no incentive to alter their behavior based on knowledge of this feedback rule.
6 Employees who understand the feedback system may understand that it tends to make employees overconfident on average, but any individual employee can do no better than to update as a Bayesian based on the information received.
Previous Literature
The proposed mechanism is, to my knowledge, novel in the literature on overconfidence.
7 A first set of papers describes agents' motivations to choose to become overconfident, whether because optimism increases utility (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005) , because confidence directly improves outcomes (Compte and Postlewaite, 2004) , or because confidence helps to overcome the tendency to procrastinate (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) . In contrast, the present setting is neoclassical: the agent's expected payoffs are maximized when the agent has a correct estimate of his own ability.
A second set of papers generates overconfidence by assuming that individuals use a biased updating process (called "biased self-attribution") that overly attributes successes to their own ability and failures to chance (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001 ). (2018) also report that ratings do vary over time for a given employee, apparently responding to performance.
6 Leaving aside questions of active experimentation, which I show in Section 7 does not in general affect the main results.
7 I here focus on overconfidence in the sense of what Moore and Healy (2008) call "overestimation," reflecting a misjudgment of absolute ability. A literature in finance has focused on what Moore and Healy (2008) call "overprecision", in which agents underestimate the variance of outcomes (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998; Burnside et al., 2011) . Much other literature studies overconfidence in the sense of what Moore and Healy (2008) call "overplacement" and the psychology literature calls the "better-than-average effect", which refers to the tendency for a majority of the population to judge their own abilities as being better than a majority of the population.
8 Though not explicitly about overconfidence, the model of confirmatory bias in Rabin and Schrag (1999) has a similar flavor. Heidhues et al. (2018) study learning about one's own ability in an extension to their Many believe (e.g., Hirshleifer, 2001 Hirshleifer, , 2015 that such biases are necessary for a neoclassical model to generate persistent overconfidence. However, the present setting generates persistent overconfidence (and also persistent underconfidence) as a result of rational Bayesian learning.
9
A third set of papers studies selection mechanisms that can make the majority of a population of Bayesian updaters believe that each of their abilities are better than average (e.g., van den Steen, 2004; Zábojník, 2004; Köszegi, 2006; Jehiel, 2016) : the common ingredient is that actors choose to stop collecting information once they receive a sufficiently positive signal about themselves or about the payoffs to some activity, so that high confidence is an absorbing state that attracts an ever greater share of the population.
10 These settings have the flavor of bandit models, as there are actions that do not generate information about the outcomes of other actions. In contrast, every effort choice in the present setting generates information about the consequences of all other possible effort choices. Average biases here result from how the speed of learning about all actions' consequences varies with the choice of action. Experimentation here never ceases, and agents never stop updating beliefs about the payoffs from all possible actions.
11
The proposed mechanism is more closely related to two recent papers. First, Silva (2017) also demonstrates how the asymmetric speed at which agents learn following good and bad shocks can generate systematic overconfidence. However, there the critical asymmetry is exogenously imposed: the agent is assumed to receive outside help following an early signal that he is of high quality but not after an early signal that he is of low quality, and this unobserved outside help subsequently prevents him from learning about his own ability. In contrast, the present paper's asymmetric speeds of learning emerge endogenously from the interaction between agents' effort choices and their statistical models of the world. Second, Hestermann and Yaouanq (2016) study an agent who is uncertain about his own fixed ability and also about some feature of the environment. If the agent is initially overconfident, then he rationally believes that good outcomes reflect his own ability whereas bad outcomes reflect a harsh environment. In this manner, overconfidence can persist for quite a while. We here see how persistent overconfidence and underconfidence can emerge even when the primary setting (in which the agent is completely sure of his own ability). Learning generates overconfidence because they assume that the agent sees a biased signal of his ability.
9 A literature that has a similar spirit as the present paper describes how rational learning can generate the appearance of risk aversion (e.g., March, 1996) .
10 Taking a different approach, Benoît and Dubra (2011) show how Bayesian updating can lead too many agents to think that they are above average when likely events reinforce beliefs in one's own quality, and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) model heterogeneity in the mapping from a set of skills to an ability index. Krähmer (2007) studies a contest in which complementarities between effort and ability lead underconfident agents to stop competing and thus lead all agents to stop learning. One agent can then become persistently overconfident with the other agents becoming persistently underconfident.
11 Ali (2011) describes conditions under which learning about one's own ability to exercise self-control may be imperfect. The mechanism is closely related to bandit models, as optimal choices may preclude costly experimentation.
agent's initial beliefs are well-calibrated and even when the agent correctly understands his environment.
Some recent work studies the possibility that learning may confirm an agent's overconfidence. In contrast to the present setting, those agents do not admit any uncertainty about their own ability and thus never update their beliefs about their ability. Heidhues et al. (2018) study when the actions chosen under the agent's permanently misspecified model of his own ability generate signals that do not lead the agent to question his incorrect beliefs about his own ability. The present setting is similar in studying the interaction between learning and overconfidence. Further, the present setting does allow for a type of model misspecification in order to clarify that overconfidence and underconfidence depend not on the actual data generating process but on the agent's beliefs about that process. However, the environments and mechanisms are in fact rather different at heart: here overconfidence emerges endogenously (rather than being imposed ex ante), here we analyze transient dynamics (rather than long-run limit beliefs, which here never display overconfidence), here the potential misspecification is not as severe (it affects only beliefs about the source of variance rather than ruling out correct beliefs about ability), and, most importantly, here misspecification is not necessary for the results (rather than being central to the model).
12
The proposed model is consistent with recent research in psychology and in management that has emphasized the role of beliefs about one's own self-efficacy in determining performance.
13 Stronger beliefs about self-efficacy have been shown to increase an agent's chosen level of effort and the persistence of an agent's effort in the face of bad shocks (Bandura, 1982; Wood and Bandura, 1989; Stajkovic and Luthans, 1998; Bandura, 2001; Tenney et al., 2015) . We will see both effects here. Further, this same literature's discussion of learning also matches the present setting: beliefs about one's own ability are thought to adjust not to absolute outcomes but to outcomes as filtered through previous beliefs about ability, and high effort is thought to enable learning about self-efficacy whereas low effort hinders learning. I will formally model this updating process and highlight the previously overlooked importance of beliefs about how effort choices interact with luck.
Outline
The next section describes the setting. Section 3 analyzes a three-period example. Section 4 shows that the agent's posterior estimates drift away from the correct estimate on average. Section 5 provides a numerical example. Section 6 connects the analysis to the modern 12 Fudenberg et al. (2017) also consider the interaction between learning and a form of misspecification that places probability zero on the truth. Again, I here study a form of misspecification that is both less severe and not necessary for the results. The agents in the present setting do converge on the truth as data accumulate.
13 Some development economists have also recently emphasized perceptions of agency (e.g., Wuepper and Lybbert, 2017; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018) . I here model the process of learning about agency and show that this learning depends on the agent's understanding of how agency affects learning.
understanding of depression. Section 7 extends the analysis to the case of forward-looking agents, who have a dynamic incentive to experiment. The final section concludes. The appendix contains proofs.
Setting
In every period t, an agent chooses how much effort e t to apply to an activity. His cost of applying effort is c(e t ), with c(·) ∈ C 2 , c (·) > 0, and c (·) > 0. The activity provides reward π t , which depends on the chosen level of effort, on the agent's ability z, and on a random shock t :
Effort and ability are complementary. 14 The shock is mean-zero, normally distributed, and serially uncorrelated, with variance σ 2 . f (·) > 0 determines the degree to which the noise depends on the agent's effort. Conditional on z, the variance of the agent's time t payoff is f (e t ) σ 2 . The agent does not know his own ability z. His beliefs about his ability are summarized by a normal distribution with mean µ t and variance Σ t , with Σ 0 > 0. The primary results will be driven by the interaction between effort and the variance of the reward. In order to isolate whether the mechanism depends on the true variance of rewards or instead depends on the agent's beliefs about that variance, I allow the agent to have a misspecified model of the data generating process. Specifically, the agent believes that rewards π t are generated as
with g(·) ∈ C 1 . The function g(·) > 0 determines the degree to which the agent believes that the variance of his rewards is driven by shocks to his ability. Importantly, I allow the agent to have a misspecified model but do not impose such misspecification: when g(·) = f (·), the agent correctly understands the data generating process, but when g(·) = f (·), the agent's statistical model is misspecified. Whereas misspecification is a critical ingredient in recent work that has highlighted the interaction between learning and overconfidence (described in the introduction), I here permit misspecification solely to clarify the mechanism. In particular, I am interested in whether f (·) or g(·) is critical for the evolution of the agent's 14 Bénabou and Tirole (2002) extensively motivate complementarity between effort and ability. In laboratory experiments, Chen and Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) show that higher estimates of one's own ability induce additional effort, as implied by the present setting (see equation (3) below). The setting has much in common with the analysis of learning in Holmström (1999), but the results end up differing because the base analysis in Holmström (1999) assumes additive separability between effort and ability and he restricts attention to a deterministic environment when extending his setting to allow for complementarity.
average beliefs. Because the results will not restrict the relationship between g(·) and f (·), they will not depend on whether the agent's model is misspecified or not.
15
The derivative of g(·) will be critical. When g (·) > 0, the agent believes that trying harder amplifies the role of luck. For example, running harder can increase the chance of an especially fast time and also, via premature exhaustion, the chance of an especially slow time; studying for a test through the night can increase the variance of one's score through the chance of decreased alertness; and not trying on a test may generate a low grade regardless of ability whereas trying hard exposes one to the variance of the test's quality. In contrast, when g (·) < 0, the agent believes that trying harder gives him more control over outcomes. For example, running harder may produce a more even pace; studying longer for a test may reduce the chance of mistakes; and trying harder on a multiple-choice test may ensure a grade that faithfully reflects ability whereas not trying may produce pure randomness.
16
The agent chooses e t to maximize his expected per-period payoffs:
whereÊ t indicates the agent's expectations at his time t information set. The agent's optimal choice of effort e * t satisfies the first-order necessary condition:
Optimal effort e * t is an increasing function of µ t . Throughout, I assume that f (·) σ 2 is sufficiently small relative to z that the probability that µ t ≤ 0 is vanishingly small.
18
15 Instead of interpreting any potential difference between f (·) and g(·) as reflecting misspecification, one can interpret g(·) as the variance of an agent's productivity left unexplained after a principal has given the agent information about, for instance, broader market conditions. In this case, any differences between f (·) and g(·) would be under the principal's control and the agent's use of g(·) would not reflect any failure of rationality.
16 The case with g (·) < 0 can be interpreted as an "internal locus of control", with g (·) ≥ 0 being an "external locus of control" (see Lybbert and Wydick, 2018) . 17 In Section 7, I analyze a forward-looking agent who accounts for the informational value of his effort choices.
18 Formally, we could model each t as being drawn from a normal distribution truncated to allow only µ t+1 > 0. As the probability mass below the truncation point becomes small, the updating rule converges to the one given below. Allowing for a nontrivial likelihood that µ t ≤ 0 would allow for zero-effort traps, where the agent stops trying and thus stops receiving new signals of his ability. Though interesting for its connection to depression (de Quidt and Haushofer, 2017) and to poverty traps (Lybbert and Wydick, 2018) , allowing for this possibility would serve to obscure the primary results.
Upon observing the payoffs π t , the agent updates his beliefs about his ability z. The agent is a Bayesian learner, 19 so the mean and variance of his beliefs evolve as
Define
as the weight that the time t agent places on the signal extracted from the observed reward π t when updating his beliefs, with 1 − w(e t , Σ t ) the weight placed on the prior µ t . Writing w t for short, equation (4) becomes:
The signal is π t /e t , not π t : the agent knows his choice of e t and adjusts the observed reward π t for this choice when constructing the signal of z.
We will be interested in the evolution of the agent's estimate of his own ability under the true data generating process (1). Formally, I study E 0 [µ t ], where E 0 indicates expectations under the true data generating process at the time 0 information set. E 0 [µ t ] averages over the possible sequences { s } t−1 s=0 with z given.
20
This representation of an agent choosing effort and inferring ability is consistent with much literature in psychology. As one leading example, Nicholls and Miller (1984, 195) observe that, for older children and adults, "Ability is conceived as capacity which, if low, may limit or, if high, may increase the effect of effort on performance. Ability is correctly inferred from both effort and outcomes; when performances are equal, lower effort implies higher ability." Ability is only ever "inferred from comparisons of performance and effort", rather than being "observed directly in the real world". The present setting captures both 19 The assumption that the agent chooses effort myopically but learns optimally is consistent with two prominent frameworks. First, "planner-doer" models of the self posit an internal conflict between a farsighted planner and a myopic doer who actually makes day-to-day decisions (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006) . Second, much work in macroeconomics has used "anticipated utility" frameworks, in which the decision-maker updates beliefs from period to period as a Bayesian but formulates policies as if current beliefs will never change (see Kreps, 1998) . The decision-maker learns only passively, without considering the informational value of his potential actions. In Section 7, I extend the analysis to an agent who learns actively.
20 The agent's expectation operatorÊ averages over both the possible sequences of and the possible values of z.
the described complementarity between ability and effort and the process through which agents infer ability from outcomes, accounting for knowledge of their own effort.
As a brief example, consider a student taking a test. The student chooses how much to focus on each question. Greater focus matters more for students with high ability than for students with low ability. Upon seeing the results of the test, students update their beliefs about their own ability, adjusting for how hard they tried on the test. This story is consistent with evidence from a recent field experiment: Gneezy et al. (2017) show that incentivizing students to exert more effort on a standardized test does improve test scores (effort matters for outcomes and responds to incentives) and improves test scores most strongly for higherability students (effort is complementary to ability). 21 The authors highlight that crosssectional comparisons of test scores across countries can mislead policymakers when students' (unobserved) effort differs across cultures. Here, we recognize that the students themselves are likely to account for their own effort choices when interpreting their own test scores, and we consider whether their beliefs will, on average, accurately reflect their abilities.
3 Three-Period Analysis I begin with an analysis of the evolution of beliefs over the first three periods before turning to the full analysis.
Assume that the agent has unbiased beliefs at time 0: µ 0 = z. From equation (7), we have:
Using µ 0 = z, we have:
On average, the agent's beliefs remain properly calibrated at time 1. Further, µ 1 is normally distributed, with variance σ 2 w 2 0 f (e 0 )/e 2 0 . Now consider the agent's central estimate at time 2:
e 1 is a random variable because it depends on µ 1 .
22 Using E 0 [µ 1 ] = z, we have:
The agent's central estimate tends to drift away from z unless the covariance is zero. From Stein's Lemma,
Recall that de 1 /dµ 1 > 0. Therefore, the agent's beliefs tend to drift away from z unless ∂w(e 1 , Σ 1 )/∂e 1 = 0, so that additional effort does not affect the agent's ability to learn from the observed reward π 1 . If ∂w(·, Σ 1 )/∂e 1 > 0, then the covariance is strictly positive and the period 2 agent will, on average, underestimate his own ability. If the agent happens to receive a positive shock in period 0, then he becomes overconfident and chooses greater effort in period 1. At that time, he tends to receive shocks that correct his overconfidence (pushing his beliefs back towards z). If ∂w(·, Σ 1 )/∂e 1 > 0, then he learns especially rapidly from these period 1 shocks and so on average enters period 2 only mildly overconfident, with an estimate close to z. However, if the agent happens to receive a negative shock in period 0, then the agent becomes underconfident and chooses a low effort level in period 1. If ∂w(·, Σ 1 )/∂e 1 > 0, then the agent does not learn much from the period 1 reward π 1 . That reward will tend to correct his underconfidence (pushing his estimate back towards z), but the agent's beliefs are not sensitive to this reward. The agent will tend to enter period 2 with an estimate that is only a bit improved from his period 1 estimate, remaining nearly as underconfident as he was in period 1. Averaging across these two cases, we expect the period 2 agent to be underconfident because the link between effort and information processing leads him to learn away overconfident period 1 beliefs faster than he learns away underconfident period 1 beliefs. But does the possibility that E 0 [µ 2 ] = µ 0 violate the Bayesian precept that the agent cannot expect to revise his beliefs in a particular direction? The analysis thus far has been from the perspective of an outside observer who knows the agent's true ability z. We therefore took expectations only over sequences of t . However, the agent does not know z. The agent therefore takes expectations over both z and t . UsingÊ 0 [z] = µ 0 , we have:
22 Σ 1 is not random because, from equation (5), it depends only on Σ 0 and e 0 . The analysis in Section 4 will account for Σ t being random for t > 1.
The agent does not expect his central estimate µ to change from period 0 to period 1. Now consider the agent's expectation of his central estimate at time 2:
g(e 1 ) e 1 1 .
UsingÊ 0 [ 1 ] = 0 and substituting for µ 1 , we have:
Using Stein's Lemma, we find:
Substituting yields:
where the second equality uses, from equation (6), w(e 0 , Σ 0 ) tend to correct the agent's initially mistaken beliefs, leading him to increase (decrease) his period 1 effort. In period 1, the agent learns the true z especially rapidly when effort is high (because z is high) and especially slowly when effort is low (because z is low). The agent's uncertainty about z drags the agent's average central estimate upwards over time because he approaches the truth faster when z is high. For the Bayesian agent, the tendency of 0 to generate underconfidence exactly cancels the tendency of z to generate overconfidence. The agent does not expect his beliefs to drift one way or the other, even though on average they will.
Why study
The literature on absolute overconfidence evaluates overconfidence relative to a benchmark true ability level, here represented by z. Moore and Healy (2008, 502) define this type of overconfidence as "the overestimation of one's actual ability, performance, level of control, or chance of success." For instance, laboratory experimenters observe agents' actual productivity on some task and evaluate overconfidence relative to that benchmark. Further, the average outcomes observed by an experimenter or econometrician are outcomes averaged over the objective distribution generated by the random shocks, not averaged over the agent's subjective distribution that also draws different values of ability. I therefore proceed by comparing E 0 [µ t ] to z.
General Analysis
I now establish that the drift in the agent's beliefs persists beyond period 2 and connect this drift to the agent's beliefs about the variance of π t .
The elasticity of g(e) with respect to e will play a critical role. Define this elasticity as χ(e) e g (e)/g(e). The following lemma shows that χ(e) determines how effort choices affect posterior beliefs: Lemma 1. For given Σ t , w t increases in e t if χ(e t ) < 2, decreases in e t if χ(e t ) > 2, and is independent of e t if χ(e t ) = 2. Σ t+1 decreases in e t if and only if w t increases in e t .
Proof. Differentiating, we have:
This is strictly positive if
e t < 2, is strictly negative if
e t > 2, and is zero if
e t = 2. The result for Σ t+1 follows straightforwardly.
To gain intuition for the importance of χ(e t ), observe that greater effort leads the agent to place more weight on the time t signal if and only if this effort reduces the perceived variance of the time t signal. The agent believes that the variance of his time t signal π t /e t is σ 2 g(e t )/e 2 t . The g(e t ) reflects the agent's beliefs about the relationship between effort and the variance of the observed outcomes π t . When g (·) > 0, the agent believes that additional effort increases the variance of the reward π t . The e 2 t captures a second effect of effort. Because effort and ability are complementary, additional effort increases the marginal effect of ability on the reward. This effect helps the agent to learn faster: it works to reduce the perceived variance of the signal π t /e t . If χ(e t ) > 2, then the two effects conflict and the first effect dominates; if χ(e t ) ∈ [0, 2), then the second effect dominates; and if χ(e t ) < 0, then the two effects go in the same direction. The two effects cancel when χ(e t ) = 2: we then have g(e t ) = A e 2 t (for some A > 0) and the variance of the perceived signal becomes A σ 2 , which is independent of effort.
The following lemma will also prove critical.
Lemma 2. There exists δ > 0 such that, for Σ 0 < δ and t ≥ 1,
If effort is fixed exogenously, then Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] = 0 for all t ≥ 1 and for any Σ 0 .
Proof. See appendix.
As suggested by the three-period analysis, the covariance between w t and µ t will drive the expected evolution of the agent's beliefs.
An Agent with Initially Unbiased Beliefs
Consider an agent who initially has unbiased beliefs, in the sense that he has correct expectations of his own ability: Assumption 1. The agent's initial beliefs are unbiased: µ 0 = z.
The following proposition shows that we should not generally expect such agents to remain unbiased over time.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then E 0 [µ 1 ] = z. Further, there exists δ > 0 such that, for Σ 0 < δ and t > 1,
If the agent commits to future effort levels at time 0, then E 0 [µ t ] = z for all t ≥ 1 and all Σ 0 .
The agent continues to have unbiased beliefs (in expectation) at time 1, but whether his later beliefs become biased depends on χ(e * (z)). Because χ depends on g(·) and not f (·), the critical determinant of whether the agent tends to become overconfident or underconfident is his understanding of the relationship between effort and chance, not the actual relationship between effort and chance. The evolution of agents' beliefs depends on the stories they tell themselves about their ability to control the world, not on their actual ability to control it. Importantly, however, the results are not affected by whether the agent's statistical model of the world is correctly specified: the proposition imposes no restrictions on the relationship between g(·) and f (·) and thus allows the agent to be fully rational, with g(·) = f (·).
To gain intuition for the proposition, observe that, by the tower property,
When χ(e * (z)) = 2, the variance of the perceived signal is independent of effort choices around e * (z). From Lemma 2, we have Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] = 0. In this case, the amount the agent learns from a period's observation does not depend on the effort level he chooses. From equation (8), we always expect new data to move the agent's beliefs towards z. Because the agent's central estimates tend to move towards z at a rate that is independent of the agent's bias, the agent's beliefs will tend to remain centered around the truth if they begin at the truth. This result is consistent with intuition from standard models of unbiased learning.
Matters are different when χ(e * (z)) = 2. Now, from Lemma 2, Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] = 0. The informativeness of the reward π t now varies with mean beliefs µ t and thus affects the expected drift in beliefs. Consider the case with χ(e * (z)) < 2. Here, additional effort enhances the signal-to-noise ratio in the reward π t . As a result, the agent's posterior becomes especially sensitive to the observed π t when effort is high: Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] > 0. High effort levels correspond to cases in which the agent's central estimate has drifted above z. The next shock is likely to pull the agent's mean back towards z, and it will do so especially rapidly because of how the agent updates beliefs under high effort levels. In contrast, when negative shocks happen to push the agent's central estimate below z, the agent will be slower to revise his beliefs back towards z because his chosen effort will be low. The agent will thus tend to get stuck with overly pessimistic self-evaluations for longer than he is stuck with overly optimistic self-evaluations. From the perspective of time 0, the agent's future central estimate will, on average, be too pessimistic. In the opposite case of χ(e * (z)) > 2, high effort levels hinder updating. The foregoing logic then implies that the agent's future central estimates will, on average, be too optimistic.
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A special case is of particular interest for its intuitive interpretation of g(e t ). Let the agent have two possible models for the variance of the random shocks: a first model in which shocks are to his ability z, and a second model in which shocks are purely external. In the first model, the marginal payoff from greater effort is stochastic, but in the second model, the marginal payoff from greater effort is deterministic. The agent places weight γ ∈ [0, 1] on the first model and weight 1 − γ on the second model. Formally, we have:
When γ = 1, the agent believes that π t = e t (z + t ), and when γ = 0, the agent believes that π t = e t z + t . The following corollary describes how the drift in the agent's beliefs depends on γ:
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 2 hold. There exists δ > 0 such that, for Σ 0 < δ and t > 1:
Proof. Note that χ(e) = 2 γe 2 γe 2 + (1 − γ) .
The result then follows from Proposition 1 once we recognize that γ < 1 implies χ(·) < 2 and that γ = 1 implies χ(·) = 2.
Return to the example from Section 2 of students taking tests and learning about their ability from their scores. Consider two groups of students, both satisfying Assumption 2. The first group of students believes that applying greater effort has stochastic consequences (γ = 1), and the second group believes that applying greater effort increases their reward deterministically (γ = 0). When a student in the first group tries hard on a test and gets a bad score, he does not adjust his beliefs about his own ability very strongly because the student writes off the result to bad luck. The student's self-assessments remain, in 23 As infinite data accumulate, the agent's beliefs are consistent in the sense that they converge, in expectation, to z. To see this, note that the sequence of data to be explained can be written as (π 1 /e 1 , π 2 /e 2 , ..., π n /e n ). Each observation is drawn from a normal distribution, with a variance that changes with e t and a mean that is constant over time. The observations are independently distributed. Choi and Ramamoorthi (2008) review consistency when observations are independently, non-identically distributed. We have a further wrinkle in that the agent's model is potentially misspecified. However, it is known that posteriors converge to the value that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the agent's model to the true data generating model (e.g., Gelman et al., 2004) , and it is easy to show that µ t = z is the minimizer in our setting. expectation, centered around his true ability. However, we expect students in the second group to have a different fate. These students believe that trying hard should allow their talent to shine through. When these students see a bad test score after trying especially hard, they infer a lack of ability. This more negative assessment of their own ability leads them to apply less effort on the next test. On average, this next test will tell them that they are more talented than they believe themselves to be, but because they know that their effort level was low, they do not pay as much attention to this score. They therefore tend to retain an overly negative self-assessment.
Agents with Biased Initial Beliefs
I now consider the evolution of an agent's beliefs when the agent does not initially start with unbiased beliefs. The expectation operator E 0 now takes on a second, natural interpretation: it captures the evolution of the population-average self-estimate of ability. I therefore also study whether the population-average self-estimate is biased.
Consider an agent with µ 0 < z (so that Assumption 1 no longer holds). This agent is underconfident to start, will clearly be underconfident on average at time 1 as he revises his ability estimate towards z, and, if χ(e * (z)) is small, will also be underconfident on average in all future periods. But what if µ 0 > z? Now the agent begins overconfident and clearly remains overconfident on average at time 1. The following proposition establishes that even such an agent eventually becomes underconfident.
Proposition 3.
2. There exists t 1 > 0 such that χ(e * (z)) < 2 implies E 0 [µ t ] < z for all t > t 1 .
3. There exists t 1 > 0 such that χ(e * (z)) > 2 implies E 0 [µ t ] > z for all t > t 1 .
As the agent learns, the agent's central estimates converge (on average) towards his true ability, and eventually the logic of Proposition 1 takes over. Therefore, whether an agent tends to become underconfident or overconfident does not depend on his initial beliefs about his own ability: we expect an agent who is initially overconfident but has χ(e * (z)) < 2 to eventually become persistently underconfident, and we expect an agent who is initially underconfident but has χ(e * (z)) > 2 to eventually become persistently overconfident. Now consider the implications of Proposition 3 for a population of agents of age t. Index agents by i. These agents may differ in any number of ways, including in their initial selfestimates µ 1. If χ i (e i * (z i )) < 2 for all i, then there exists t 1 > 0 such thatμ t <z for all t > t 1 .
If χ
i (e i * (z i )) > 2 for all i, then there exists t 1 > 0 such thatμ t >z for all t > t 1 .
Proof. Follows from applying Proposition 3 to each agent in the population.
A tendency to become over-or underconfident is not just an artifact of averaging over a single individual's possible outcomes. Instead, this tendency can manifest itself within a heterogeneous population of agents. These agents may have begun with wildly different true abilities and wildly different self-estimates. Nonetheless, their asymmetric rates of learning after good and bad shocks will assert itself over time. If the agents tell themselves similar stories about the relationship between effort and luck, then we should expect to discover systematic biases in self-perception.
A Numerical Example
I now consider a numerical example. Impose c(e t ) = 10 e 2 t . Let z = µ 0 = 20, σ 2 = Σ 0 = 16, f (e t ) = e α t , and g(e t ) = eα t . This example satisfies Assumption 1. Note that χ(·) =α. The top left panel of Figure 1 maintains α =α, so that the agent has a correctly specified statistical model of the world. Consistent with the theory, the agent becomes overconfident on average forα > 2 and becomes underconfident on average forα < 2. The degree of overor underconfidence is larger whenα is farther from 2. As time passes, the agent's beliefs converge towards the agent's true ability, but biases remain even after 100 periods.
The remaining panels of Figure 1 show that, in accord with the theory, the evolution of the agent's beliefs depends onα, not α. These panels fix α = 2 andα = 0, so that χ(·) = 0 in these other three panels. The top right panel plots the distribution of µ t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10}. µ 1 is normally distributed but the other distributions are skewed.
24 The distribution of µ t becomes progressively narrower as data accumulate. Each distribution's mode is clearly below z when t > 1.
The lower left panel of Figure 1 confirms the results of Proposition 1: E 0 [µ t ] equals z at t = 1, but E 0 [µ t ] drops below z at t = 2 and remains below z for all greater t. E 0 [µ t ] does approach z again as t goes to infinity, but this approach is slow. The maximum average bias arises in period 4. The average bias is still 76% of this maximum in period 10 and 12% of this maximum in period 100. The circles show that the agent's uncertainty about his ability does decline quickly as he observes additional data, but his beliefs nonetheless remain biased on average.
The lower right panel plots Cov 0 [µ t , w t ] (crosses) as well as the correlation (circles) between µ t and w t . The covariance and correlation are positive because states of the world with large µ t are states in which the agent chooses high effort e t and because w t increases in e t . We see that the covariance is especially positive in early periods when the agent is most uncertain about his own ability. The covariance approaches zero after the first few periods not because µ t and w t become uncorrelated over long horizons (the correlation in fact remains clearly positive even at long horizons) but because the variance of each variable declines strongly as the agent becomes more certain of his ability.
Application 2: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
The foregoing analysis sheds new light on the nature of depression and on possible reasons why current treatments are successful. In the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, psychologists sought the reasons for the negative thoughts that characterize depression. In the 1960s and 1970s, a revolution in psychology viewed negative thinking as the content of depression (Seligman, 1991) . Aaron Beck, one of the forefathers of modern clinical psychology, writes, The cognitive theory of depression is based essentially on an informationprocessing model. A pronounced and prolonged negative biasing of this process is manifest in the characteristic thinking disorder in depression (selective abstraction, overgeneralization, negative self-attributions). (Beck, 2002, 29) Beck refers to the negative filter as a form of "automatic thinking". Seligman (1991) refers to it as a "pessimistic explanatory style" and emphasizes how agents with this explanatory style attribute bad events to their own pervasive self rather than to transient, chance outcomes. This negative filter causes the agent to doubt his own ability and leaves the agent especially vulnerable to negative shocks. The agent withdraws from the world, displaying the passivity and inertia that characterize depressives' behavior. The agent's self-doubt reinforces his inactivity, and his inactivity closes off the possibility of receiving new signals that could ameliorate his self-doubt. behavior by convincing the agent to re-engage with the world, and second, the therapist aims to change the agent's negative thinking by teaching new information processing techniques (Layard and Clark, 2015) . In empirical tests, cognitive behavioral therapy has been found to effectively mitigate depression. Further, patients relapse at a lower rate than after other treatments, including pharmacological treatments (Seligman, 1991; Scott, 1996; Hollon et al., 2005; Butler et al., 2006; Dobson et al., 2008; Driessen and Hollon, 2010; Layard and Clark, 2015) . One line of thought posits that cognitive behavioral therapy does not just treat an instance of depression but also "inoculates" patients against future depression (Seligman, 1991) . The present setting captures both this understanding of depression and the short-and long-run benefits of cognitive behavioral therapy. We see that when an agent believes that his efforts produce strong signals of his own ability (i.e., χ(·) is small), then the agent tends to become underconfident because he learns away positive shocks quickly but does not learn away negative shocks quickly. When positive shocks lead him to a high estimate of his own ability, he increases his effort level and attributes future shocks to his own ability. But when his self-estimate is overly inflated, any news is likely to be negative. He therefore revises his self-estimate sharply downward and reduces his effort accordingly.
26 This agent demonstrates the "pessimistic explanatory style" described by Seligman (1991) , attributing this negative news to his own shortcomings rather than to chance. If the agent's ability estimate falls far enough, then the news is now, on average, going to be positive, but this overly pessimistic agent discounts that news because he knows that he did not apply much effort. The agent becomes underconfident on average because he discounts these positive shocks as largely due to chance even though he treated the initial negative shocks as especially reflective of his own ability. In contrast, agents with large χ(·) do not believe that they should learn more from applying high effort levels. These agents tend to maintain an overly optimistic self-assessment because they write off the negative shocks that tend to accompany high effort choices as largely due to chance while emphasizing their own role in the positive shocks that tend to accompany low effort levels.
Especially acute negative shocks are known to trigger depression (Seligman, 1991; Beck, 2002) . In the present setting, an agent's estimate of his own ability may fall to an especially low level following such a shock. His effort will also fall, so that he displays the passivity and inertia characteristic of depression.
27 This low effort will allow only very slow learning. The agent thus persists in his negative beliefs despite receiving signals that his ability is not actually so low. Treatments that lead the agent to re-engage with the world (either directly 26 This mechanism is in line with findings that depression is especially likely after shocks that agents believe could have resulted from their own behavior (Kendler et al., 1999) .
27 Consider Beck's criteria for depression, summarized in de Quidt and Haushofer (2017): depressed individuals have low self-evaluation (here, low µ t ), negative expectations (hereÊ[µ t+s ] = µ t ), self-blame due to egocentric notions of causality (here, agents with χ(·) < 2 ascribe adverse outcomes to their own efforts when they try hard), and withdrawal (here, low effort).
or by raising his estimate of his own ability) can be successful at curing his depression: the agent can return to a state with better self-confidence and greater effort once he starts receiving more informative signals as a result of applying more effort (compare Lewinsohn and Libet, 1972) . However, as long as χ(·) is small, his average estimates will once again tend to fall below his true ability. Only a treatment that changes his form of information processing can have longer-run effects in preventing a relapse of depression. If a treatment can teach the agent to stop expecting high effort to provide more control over the world, then the agent will be able to maintain higher confidence on average and will recover faster from negative shocks. This analysis is consistent with the goals of cognitive behavioral therapy.
I have developed a theory of rational depression that comports with one leading explanation from psychology. de Quidt and Haushofer (2017) wonder how Bayesian updating with a lifetime of data can allow a negative shock to generate a negative self-evaluation. They suggest that ex ante behavioral biases in belief updating may be necessary, as have been studied in previous literature on overconfidence (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001 ). However, we here see that Bayesian updating is entirely consistent with an overly negative interpretation of a lifetime of data and with sharper reactions to negative news than to positive news. I merely postulate that some agents believe (correctly or not) that greater effort provides a better signal of their own ability. Agents who believe that increasing effort should make the world respond in a more regular way quickly learn away high confidence states but learn away low confidence states only slowly. As a result, the "pessimistic explanatory style" described by Seligman (1991) emerges endogenously from rational updating: an agent with χ(·) small tends to attribute bad events to his own pervasive ability, and such agents become underconfident on average. Rather than being a behavioral bias that causes depression, a pessimistic explanatory style may simply reflect the combination of rational effort choices and the (possibly correct) stories that Bayesian updaters tell themselves about the origin of chance events. A treatment for depression can have long-term success only if it changes agents' understanding of the relationship between effort and luck, which may explain the success of cognitive behavioral therapy relative to some other treatments.
Forward-Looking Effort Choices
I have thus far assumed that agents choose effort myopically. I now extend the analysis to the case of forward-looking agents, who account for the informational value of their effort choices.
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The agent now chooses effort to maximize expected present value over an infinite planning 28 Heidhues et al. (2018) also extend their primary analysis to forward-looking agents. I cannot use their proof technique because they are interested in the long-run limit distribution of beliefs. Here beliefs always do eventually converge to the true value of ability. I am instead interested in average beliefs after a finite number of observations. The introduction discusses further differences between the two papers.
horizon. Let the agent's per-period discount factor be β ∈ (0, 1), and let V (µ t , Σ t ) denote the present value of the agent's optimal policy program from any time t with estimate µ t and variance Σ t . The agent's effort choices and value function solve the following Bellman equation:
subject to the transition equations (4) and (5). The appendix shows that effort choices still depend on µ t . Therefore, endogenous effort choices may still create the asymmetrical rates of learning that generated the drift in the myopic agent's ability estimate. Now consider forward-looking effort choices if the world were known to end after period 2. Assume that µ 0 = z. Following the derivation in Section 3,
The agent chooses effort myopically in the final period:
c (e * 2 ) = µ 2 .
Because e * 2 is independent of Σ 2 , the period 2 value function is also independent of Σ 2 . We have V 2 (µ 2 ) = e * 2 (µ 2 ) µ 2 − c(e * 2 (µ 2 )) and, by the envelope theorem, V 2 (µ 2 ) = e * 2 (µ 2 ). In period 1, the agent solves:
1 e 1 z − c(e 1 ) + βV 2 (µ 2 ) .
The first-order condition is:
c (e 1 ) = µ 1 + βÊ 1 V 2 (µ 2 ) dµ 2 de 1 .
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Figure 2: Left: Average estimates for myopic (solid) and forward-looking agents (β = 0.5, dotted) against χ(·) =α, maintainingα = α. Right: The difference in average effort, estimates, and uncertainty between a myopic agent and a forward-looking agent (β = 0.9), with χ(·) =α = 0 and α = 2. All plots sample 10,000 trajectories for t .
Observe that:
A Bayesian agent does not expect his actions to change his central estimate in one direction or the other. The first-order condition becomes
, which defines e * 1 as a function of µ 1 and Σ 1 . For given e * 1 , µ 1 does not affect the covariance. The right-hand side therefore depends directly on µ 1 only through the first term, so e * 1 increases in µ 1 if the second-order condition holds at time 1. In that case, from equation (10),
A forward-looking agent with χ(·) < 2 becomes underconfident on average by period 2, and a forward-looking agent with χ(·) > 2 becomes overconfident on average by period 2.
29
29 It is well-known that the second-order condition may not hold in models with active learning because the value function is convex in the priors (Nyarko, 1994) . Following Easley and Kiefer (1988) , the second-order condition holds if c (·) is sufficiently large or β is sufficiently small. Failure of the second-order condition can lead to very different types of policy programs, beyond the scope of the present analysis (see Balvers and Cosimano, 1993) .
Finally, consider the implications of extending the numerical examples from Section 5 to the infinite-horizon setting of (9).
30 The left panel of Figure 2 considers the case in which the agent has a correctly specified model of the world, with α =α. The solid lines give E 0 [µ t ] for a myopic agent and the dotted lines give E 0 [µ t ] for a forward-looking agent with β = 0.5. We see that the two agents' mean beliefs follows remarkably similar paths. The right panel sets α = 2 andα = 0 and plots the percentage change between a myopic agent and a forward-looking agent with β = 0.9. Active learning motivations are important: the forward-looking agent chooses substantially higher effort (circles) in order to learn her own ability faster (squares). Remarkably, however, E 0 [µ t ] (crosses) differs by less than 0.2% between the forward-looking and myopic agents. The forward-looking agent therefore becomes underconfident almost exactly as shown in the lower left panel of Figure 1 , despite reducing her uncertainty much faster. These examples indicate that the conclusions of the myopic analysis are not too sensitive to allowing agents to anticipate the informational value of their effort choices.
Conclusion
We have seen that rational Bayesian agents become, on average, persistently underconfident when they believe that additional effort makes outcomes more predictable and become, on average, persistently overconfident when they believe that additional effort makes outcomes sufficiently less predictable. The critical element is that returns to effort vary with agents' beliefs about their own ability. As a result, agents' effort choices vary with their beliefs about their own ability. When agents believe that high effort provides a particularly informative signal of ability, agents learn away mistaken overconfidence quickly (due to high effort) but learn away mistaken underconfidence only slowly (due to low effort). Such agents become underconfident on average. But if agents believe that high effort provides a particularly uninformative signal of their ability, they become overconfident on average. All agents' ability estimates do asymptotically converge on their true ability, but their rational effort choices and Bayesian updating ensure that their beliefs become systematically biased in the interim, whether or not they begin with correctly calibrated beliefs.
These results call for two further types of investigations. First, psychologists have successfully connected "explanatory styles" to a range of outcomes. The present model provides one structural interpretation of explanatory styles, identifying the types of beliefs that can generate observed patterns. Future research should assess agents' views on the informativeness of effort for ability. Second, the results call for experiments that test the implications 30 I solve the forward-looking model via value function iteration. I use the collocation method, with 10 2 Chebyshev nodes and a 10 2 Chebyshev basis. I integrate via Gauss-Legendre quadrature. The domain of approximation for µ extends from 1 to 50, and the domain of approximation for Σ ranges from 0 to (11/10)Σ 0 .
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for confidence of manipulating the data generating process and/or effort. Recent work (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2017) experimentally manipulates effort in order to test the importance of effort for outcomes. The present model suggests also exploring the importance of effort for agents' willingness to extract information from outcomes and connecting these results to the evolution of agents' over-or underconfidence.
A Proof of Lemma 2 Part 1
We derive the conditions under which Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] > 0 for all t ≥ 1. We proceed by induction.
Induction step:
The induction hypothesis is that Cov 0 [w t−1 , µ t−1 ] > 0 for some t ≥ 2. Use a first-order approximation to w(e * (µ t ), Σ t ) around µ t = z and Σ t = Σ 0 to obtain, from Taylor's Theorem,
where
Note that:
Substituting, we have:
A first-order Taylor expansion of µ t around µ t−1 = z, Σ t−1 = Σ 0 , and t−1 = 0 yields:
where + H (µ t , µ t−1 , Σ t−1 , t−1 ) (1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) w(e * (z), Σ 0 )
−
(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 ))
4
(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) w(e * (z), Σ 0 ) Cov 0 [µ t−1 , R 1 (µ t−1 , Σ t−1 )] . (1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 2i .
The final term is a geometric series with common ratio (1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 2 < 1. Using the fact that the value to which this series converges is maximized as t → ∞, we have:
(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 2i ≤ w(e * (z), Σ 0 ) 1 − (1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 2 = 1 2 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 ) .
Therefore, for x ≤ 1,
(1 − x) − (1 − x)(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 3 w(e * (z), Σ 0 )
(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 2 ≥(1 − x) − (1 − x)(1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) 3 1 2 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 ) =(1 − x) 1 − (1 − w(e * (z), Σ 0 )) where p 0 (µ t , Σ t ) indicates the joint distribution of µ t and Σ t from the time 0 information set. The second line vanishes before Σ 0 reaches zero. And the final two lines vanish if we choose Σ 0 sufficiently small that there is negligible probability of µ t deviating from z by more than √ δ in either direction. The absolute value of the first line on the right-hand side is less than
The first expression goes to zero faster than the square of Σ 0 (because Σ t ≤ Σ 0 ), and the second goes to zero faster than δ 2 . We can therefore pick Σ 0 and δ to make Cov 0 [µ t , R(µ t , Σ t )] arbitrarily small.
Both Cov 0 [µ t , R(µ t , Σ t )] and the first two lines on the right-hand side of inequality (A-6) go to zero as Σ 0 goes to zero, but Cov 0 [µ t , R(µ t , Σ t )] goes to zero faster because ∂w(e t , Σ t ) ∂Σ t
Σt=0
= e 2 t g(e t ) σ −2 > 0.
The analysis of the other terms with the Taylor expansion remainders is similar. We can therefore choose Σ 0 (and δ) sufficiently small that the first two lines on the right-hand side of inequality (A-6) dominate the other lines. In this case, Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] > 0 under the induction hypothesis that Cov 0 [w t−1 , µ t−1 ] > 0 and the assumption that χ(e * (z)) < 2.
Basis step:
We have µ 1 =(1 − w 0 )µ 0 + w 0 z + f (e 0 ) e 0 0 , with w 0 = Note that w 0 is not random. µ 1 depends on only one random variable ( 0 ), which is itself normal and enters linearly. 
B Proof of Proposition 1
First note that E 0 [µ 1 ] = (1 − w 0 )µ 0 + w 0 z = µ 0 + w 0 (z − µ 0 ) = µ 0 = z, (A-10)
where we recognize that µ 0 = z by assumption.
Part 1
Assume that χ(e * (z)) < 2.
Induction step:
The induction hypothesis is that E 0 [µ t ] < z for some t > 1. We have the following by the tower property: 
Part 2
Assume that χ(e * (z)) > 2.
Induction step:
The induction hypothesis is that E 0 [µ t ] > z for some t > 1. From equation (A-11), the induction hypothesis, and the definition of w t , we have E 0 [µ t+1 ] > z if Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] ≤ 0. The second part of Lemma 2 established that, in fact, Cov 0 [w t , µ t ] < 0 for t ≥ 1 and Σ 0 sufficiently small. Therefore E 0 [µ t+1 ] > z under the induction hypothesis that E 0 [µ t ] > z.
Basis step:
